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Abstract
In the middle of the nineties the rural population in Burkina Faso was seriously
hit by rising food prices. Whereas cotton farmers were able to cope with this
shock given the simultaneous boom in the cotton sector, food crop farmers had
to withdraw children from school and to let them work more intensively. Us-
ing the exogenous character of the income variation as an instrument allows to
disentangle the pure eﬀect of parental income from eﬀects related to parental
education, family background and other unobservables. A set of simple pol-
icy simulations illustrates the potential of unconditional cash transfers to raise
schooling levels and to protect investment in children’s education against tran-
sitory income shocks. Although the involved eﬀects are not negligible and much
higher as simulations based on the pure OLS eﬀect would suggest, they also
show that making transfers conditional on attendance might largely increase the
eﬃciency of such transfers.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I21, O12, Q12.
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11 Introduction
The United Nations’ World Food Programme warns of the catastrophic eﬀects
of rising food prices on hunger and poverty.1 In 1997/98 Burkina Faso was hit by
a severe drought, even by Burkinab` e standards. Following that drought prices
of the three main food crops, sorghum, millet and maize increased by more than
40 percent. These food crops account in normal times for about 30 percent of
total expenditures (including imputed expenditures for own production) of rural
households in the poorest quintile of the expenditure distribution. This surge in
food prices signiﬁed a dramatic increase in the poverty line in nominal terms. In
consequence, rural poverty increased between 1994 and 1998 by 5.3 percentage
points (Grimm and G¨ unther, 2007a). In the same time cotton exports increased
tremendously driven by the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994, a favorable
development of the world market price for cotton and a signiﬁcant expansion
of land used for cotton production. This boom mitigated the eﬀects of the
drought for cotton farmers and prevented expenditures to decline as much as
those of food crop farmers. Although Burkina Faso knew another drought in
2000/01, though less severe, real expenditures of food crop and cotton farmers
were higher in 2003 than in 1998.
Many empirical studies have shown that if households operating in an en-
vironment of incomplete ﬁnancial markets as it is the case in most parts of
Sub-Saharan Africa are aﬀected by such shocks, they rely on strategies such
as the depletion of assets, increased labor supply and the withdraw of children
from school to meet their basic needs (see e.g., Jacoby and Skouﬁas, 1997). I
analyze whether in Burkina Faso delayed enrolment and school dropouts were
also a strategy of food crop farmers to compensate the adverse eﬀects of the
drought and whether, in contrast, children of cotton farmers were sheltered, at
least to some extent, against that shock, given the simultaneous cotton boom.
The fact that food crop and cotton farmers where hit so diﬀerently by ex-
ogenous shocks during that period provides a natural experiment which may
also allow to quantify accurately the income elasticity of children’s school en-
rolment. Estimates of that elasticity based on a simple regression of schooling
on income are usually biased due to simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity and
possibly measurement error. Using the income shocks as instruments can help
to remove these biases.
Un unbiased estimate of the income elasticity of schooling can help to de-
sign safety nets which allow parents to keep their children at school in times of
economic hardship. More generally, such an estimate is of course also needed if
policy makers see conditional or unconditional cash transfer programs, of the
type implemented in many parts of Latin America and Asia, as one option
to increase education levels in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is still a lively de-
bate about the role of parental income for children’s schooling. So far there is
only little evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa, although this region has the lowest
education levels in the world. Low education perpetuates social mobility and
inequality and has many other adverse eﬀects which have not to be repeated
1See http://www.wfp.org/.
2here.
Enormous ﬁnancial resources will be allocated by governments and interna-
tional donors to investments in children’s education in Africa and hence infor-
mation of the type mentioned above is important to think how to spend these
resources in the most eﬃcient way. Institutional constraints make it still dif-
ﬁcult to implement (conditional) cash transfer programs (Schubert and Slater,
2006), but the need for such interventions is in principle high, given the usually
extreme vulnerability of poor rural households.
This paper will show that children of food crop farmers were seriously af-
fected by the drought. Food crop farmers knew on average a decline by more
than 30 percent of their income which led to a drop of more than 10 percent in
enrollment rates. This corresponds to about 100,000 children which have not
been enrolled or have been withdrawn from school. The income eﬀect is high
and in particular much higher than a simple OLS regression would suggest.
Thus the World Food Programme is right in warning of the detrimental eﬀects
of rising food prices.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
short review of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the economic context
in Burkina Faso and provides some information about the education system.
Section 4 analyzes the eﬀect of the drought and the cotton boom on children’s
schooling in cotton and food crop farming households. Section 5 estimates using
an original IV approach the income elasticity of enrollment. Section 6 presents
based on the estimated income eﬀects, some simple policy simulations of ﬁctive
cash transfer programs designed to mitigate the eﬀects of shocks on children’s
schooling. The paper ends in Section 7 with some concluding remarks.
2 A review of the literature
Various papers have analyzed the impact of transitory and unanticipated in-
come shocks on indicators related to children’s schooling in poor rural settings.
The theoretical background of these papers is that under liquidity constraints,
caused by the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to smooth consumption
through credit and savings, the standard human capital investment model of
child labor and schooling decisions introduced by Schultz (1960) and formalized
by Ben-Porath (1967) does not apply. As pointed out by Baland and Robinson
(2000), if parents face such constraints then in a case of a negative shock they
have to trade oﬀ the future beneﬁts of educating their children against their
current consumption needs. Therefore children are not enrolled or drop out
of school in order to contribute to household income and to help to maintain
current consumption, even if the return to child labor is below the return of
education.
Jacoby (1994) was one of the ﬁrst who empirically showed using data for
Peru that income shocks can have a notable impact on school attendance in poor
settings. He emphasized that this eﬀect stemmed mainly from those households
which were credit constrained, as measured by the predicted probability of hav-
ing positive savings or outstanding nonbusiness loans. In another paper, Jacoby
3and Skouﬁas (1997) focused in particular on the impact of seasonal ﬂuctuations
in the income of agrarian households distinguishing aggregate from idiosyncratic
and anticipated from unanticipated income shocks. Using panel data from In-
dia, the authors found that small farm households were inadequately insured
ex ante, and, hence, unanticipated income shocks signiﬁcantly aﬀected chil-
dren’s school attendance. They also found that households, again in particular
smaller farm househoolds, faced serious credit market constraints, sometimes
combined with limited storage opportunities, which again had adverse impacts
on children’s school attendance.
Kazianga (2005) used similar panel data for six villages in rural Burkina
Faso, the country on which this paper also focuses on. He also pointed to
the potential beneﬁt of informal insurance mechanisms. He showed that for
households without any access to insurance the frequency of income shocks, as
measured by the predicted income variance, reduced educational investments
in boys and, in particular, in girls.
Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti (2006) used panel data for Tanzania to examine
the extent to which transitory income shocks led to increases in child labor and
whether household’s asset holdings mitigated the eﬀects of these shocks. For
this purpose they regressed child labor hours on an interaction term of asset
ownership and shocks controlling for household ﬁxed eﬀects and a number of
time varying household characteristics. They ﬁnd that crop shocks led to a
signiﬁcant increase in the level of child labor, but that households with assets
were able to oﬀset at least a large part of that shock. Richer households tended
to use their assets rather as collateral against credit, whereas poorer households
tended to use them rather as a buﬀer. However, school enrollment decreased
less than expected because many children were able to combine school and
work.
Other papers focused on child labor and children’s school enrollment in
the context of economic crisis. Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg et al. (2004),
for instance, analyzed the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis in Indonesia on chil-
dren’s school enrollment, by relating income to school enrollment and education
spending. They found a substantial eﬀect on schooling in particular in poorer
households. However, poorer households had a tendency to protect education
investments of older children at the expense of younger ones.
All these studies show convincingly that household income matters for chil-
dren’s schooling whenever households have only limited insurance and limited
possibilities to smooth their consumption through credit and savings. However,
these studies do not provide an accurate estimate of the income eﬀect, which
could be used to design safety nets, such as conditional or unconditional cash
transfer programs, which would help households to overcome those shocks with-
out withdrawing their children from school. To get an idea how much income
has to be transferred, one needs to know the income elasticity of enrollment,
once the eﬀects of reverse causality and omitted variables, in particular parents’
unobserved preferences and abilities, have been controlled for. An issue which
will be addressed in this paper.
For industrialized countries the causal impact of parental income on chil-
dren’s educational attainment was intensively studied using either panel data
4(see e.g., Blau, 1999) or instrumental variables (see e.g., Shea, 2000; Mau-
rin, 2002; Chevalier, Harmon, O’Sullivan and Walker, 2005), the latter more
and more often based on natural experiments (see e.g., Black, Devereux and
Salvanes, 2005; Løken, 2007). The diﬀerent identifying assumptions made in
these studies can of course be subject to debate and it is diﬃcult to draw a
sharp conclusion. It is also plausible that the eﬀect diﬀers by country and
time even within the group of industrialized countries. However, it seems the
income eﬀects in richer countries are relatively weak and that the eﬀect of omit-
ted parental abilities dominates, i.e. the OLS estimate of the income eﬀect is
rather upward than downward biased.
For developing countries this literature is relatively limited. Behrman and
Wolfe (1987) used siblings data to analyze the respective roles of unobserved
family backgrounds, parental education and income in Nicaragua. They showed
that the impact of parental education is strongly reduced once family ﬁxed ef-
fects are introduced. They did not ﬁnd an eﬀect of various measures of parental
income on children’s schooling. However, the use of family ﬁxed eﬀects in such a
context is often criticized for inappropriately assuming that unobserved abilities
are constant across siblings (see e.g., Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001).
Cogneau and Maurin (2003) is one of the rare studies which investigated
the issue for a Sub-Saharan African country, Madagascar. They instrumented
parental income by the diﬀerence in parental and grand-parental education.
Using past educational achievements ensures that the instrument is uncorre-
lated with the error term and transitory income. By taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence,
they eliminate the family ﬁxed eﬀect. In contrast to the results of Behrman and
Wolfe (1987), their instrumented income eﬀect is three to four times larger than
the non-instrumented eﬀect. Parental education becomes almost insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that parental education is rather a proxy for permanent income.2
Other studies relied on natural experiments, as this study will do. Rucci
(2004) looked at changes in enrollment rates during the Argentinean crisis and
instruments household income by the lagged Brazilian Real-US Dollar exchange
rate. She also found the IV estimate, depending on age and gender of the child,
to be two to seven times larger than the OLS estimate. Cogneau and Jedwab
(2007) took cocoa price shocks in Cˆ ote d’Ivoire as an instrument for income
and explored the diﬀerence in investments in children’s education and health
in families of cocoa and food crop farmers. Regarding the eﬀects on education,
they ﬁnd an income elasticity of primary school enrollment which is three to
four times higher than an elasticity estimated by OLS. For instance, for the age
group ﬁve to eleven years old, they found that an increase in income by ten
percent increased enrollment by almost three percent.3
For Latin America and to a minor extent also for South-East Asia there are
of course also all those studies which examine the impact of conditional cash
2Behrman and Knowles (1999) survey a large number of other studies. However, most of
them do not address the limitations regarding the use of current annual income or expendi-
tures.
3Jensen (2000) and Kruger (2007) also rely on natural experiments to investigate the impact
of income on education, however, they used reduced form estimators and thus did not provide
an estimate of the income elasticity of enrollment.
5transfer programs, where the condition is on school enrollment (see e.g., Schultz
2004). While these studies provide many interesting insights they do not allow
to conclude on the impact of unconditional income transfers4 and they also
do most likely not allow to conclude on such income eﬀects in the Sub-Saharan
African context. Although enrollment rates in that region, in particular in rural
areas, are by far the lowest in the world.
This paper contributes in several respects to the literature discussed above.
First, it shows, as have some other papers before, that unanticipated transitory
shocks on household income have immediate eﬀects on children’s school enroll-
ment suggesting that other risk-coping instruments are insuﬃcient. Second,
it provides a relatively accurate estimate of the causal impact of income on
children’s enrollment in a very poor rural Sub-Saharan African setting. Third,
based on the estimated income eﬀects, the paper also provides some simple
policy simulations to illustrate how cash transfers could mitigate the adverse
eﬀects of such income shocks.
3 Background
3.1 Agricultural production and prices
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2005, GDP per
capita in was estimated at only PPP US$ 1,213 and according to the Human
Development Index, the country was ranked 176th out of 177 countries (UNDP,
2007). It is a landlocked country in the middle of West-Africa with a population
of roughly 13,4 million. It has a very low human capital base and only very
few natural resources. The country depends highly on cotton exports, which
account for almost 60 percent of total export earnings, as well as on international
aid. More than 80 percent of the Burkinab` e population lives in rural areas
working predominantly in the agricultural sector, which, again, suﬀers from
very limited rainfall and recurrent severe droughts.
Figure 1 shows that as a result of the severe drought in 1997/98 total pro-
duction of the three main food crops decreased by almost 20 percent. Although
the production of maize increased during that period, given its relative low
weight in food consumption, maize production could not compensate for the
decline in millet and sorghum production. In the same time cotton production
increased by more than 70 percent.
[insert Figure 1]
Figure 2 shows that the prices of cereals rose tremendously between 1994
and 1998. This rise was caused ﬁrst of all by the production shortage following
the drought. But even before prices tended to rise due to a general lack of
productivity increases in cereal production, accompanied by high population
growth and intra-annual price ﬂuctuations. Demand from neighboring countries
also put pressure on cereal prices in Burkina Faso during that time.
4Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003) for instance show that in the case of Bolsa Escola
the unconditional eﬀect is much lower than the conditional eﬀect.
6[insert Figure 2]
Following the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994 and the favorable de-
velopment of the world market price of cotton, the Burkinab` e cotton marketing
board ‘Soci´ et´ e Burkinab` e des ﬁbres textitles’ (SOFITEX), which was in place
at that time,5 increased in several steps the producer price. Although the costs
of inputs increased as well, given that most of them have to be imported, but
the rise in prices still provided enough incentives to expand cotton produc-
tion, mainly by the expansion of land allocated to cotton production. Returns
per hectare increased by only 20 percent between 1994 and 1998 (Grimm and
G¨ unther, 2007b).
After 1998 cereal prices fell back to their normal level, before rising again due
to a second drought in 2000/01 though less severe. The immediate consequences
of that second drought are diﬃcult to assess, since household survey data only
exists for 1994, 1998 and 2003. As the Figures 1 and 2 show, in 2002 the cereal
market was already back to normality.
Obviously such price hikes in food staples can always have two types of
consequences. Households who are net producers of these cereals will beneﬁt,
i.e. the income eﬀect will more than outweigh the price eﬀect. Households who
are net consumers will, in turn, suﬀer real income losses. Household survey data
for 1998 shows, that in rural areas 94 percent of all households produced cereals,
but only 15 percent sold any on the market. In contrast, the share of purchased
cereals in total cereal consumption was on average 49 percent (Grimm and
G¨ unther, 2007b). Thus, in rural Burkina Faso most of the households should
be losers of such price increases. It also suggests that households often have
some other non-agricultural activities to generate the cash income necessary to
purchase food.6.
It is important to emphasize that the cereal prices shown in Figure 2 are
consumer and not producer prices. The latter are often much lower given the
negotiation power of traders and the information asymmetries prevailing be-
tween traders and farmers. Farmers do often also not have appropriate storage
possibilities and thus are forced to sell their cereals directly after the harvest
and, hence, prices tend to fall. Traders in turn, are able to store cereals, to
speculate in the market and to drive the price up by allocating their supply
over the whole year.
To conclude, given the price and production movements of cereals and cot-
ton, the hypothesis is that cotton farmers were much less aﬀected by the drought
than farmers who cultivate only food crops. Given the lack of formal insurance
and credit and, as shown by Kazianga and Udry (2006), the only limited ev-
idence of risk sharing and consumption smoothing in Burkina Faso (see also
Reardon, Matlon and Delgado (1996)), food crop farmers may have withdrawn
their children from school or not enrolled in a ﬁrst place even if they expected
that this shock is only transitory. As discussed in Section 2, there is similar
5At that time SOFITEX was the only importer of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer
and pesticides and the only buyer of cotton. For a detailed description of the sector, see e.g.
Kaminski (2007).
6See Reardon, Matlon and Delgado (1988) for similar evidence on Burkina Faso
7evidence for a number of other countries. If cotton farmers expected the shock
on cereal prices to be transitory and the shock on cotton prices to be perma-
nent, which is however not very likely given the dependance of the producer
price on the world market price, they may even have increased the schooling
of their children. Given the fact that cotton farmers knew a diﬀerent income
shock during the period under consideration, it is possible under some further
assumptions, which will be discussed below, to make an inference on the causal
relationship between income and children’s schooling.
3.2 Schooling system
In Burkina Faso basic education includes pre-school classes for a maximum
duration of three years, normally children from three to six years can attend.
Primary school starts oﬃcially at the age of seven and lasts in total six years.
Upon successful completion, children receive the Certiﬁcat d’Etudes Primaires
(CEP) which qualiﬁes also for the entry in secondary school.
Secondary school comprises two types of curricula: the general curriculum
and a technical curriculum. Lower secondary education lasts four years and
ends with the Brevet d’Etudes du Premier Cycle (BEPC) in case of the general
curriculum and with the Certiﬁcat d’Aptitude Professionnelle (CAP) in case of
the technical curriculum. General higher secondary education lasts three years.
Technical higher secondary education can be three years (long) or two years
(short). The respective diploma are Baccalaur´ eat (BAC), Brevet de Technicien
(BT) and Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles (BEP). The BAC allows to enter
tertiary education.
In principle school is compulsory for the age group six to sixteen. But
the law explicitly states that this is conditional on the availability of schools,
teaching material and teachers (see e.g., Pilon, 2002). De facto, many children
never go to school or if they do, only a few years, in particular in rural areas.
In addition school entry is often delayed, repetition rates are high and there is
still an important gender gap in rural areas, although it is decreasing.
The schooling system comprises public and private schools. Private schools
charge fees. Public schools were always free of charge and parents only had
to buy pens, books and a school uniform. Until 2007 it was also custom that
parents paid each year 1,000 CFA F (about 10 PPP US$) into the parents
association. However, this was abolished in 2007. Now, public and private
schools are receiving text books by the government.
4 Data
I use three nation-wide representative household survey data sets, so-called
Enquˆ ete Prioritaires (EP), undertaken in 1994 (EP I), 1998 (EP II) and 2003
(EP III) covering around 8,500 households in each year. These surveys were con-
ducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et de la D´ emographie (INSD)
with technical and ﬁnancial support of the World Bank. These surveys contain
relatively detailed information on household’s socio-demographic characteris-
tics, education, employment, agricultural and non-agricultural activities as well
8as consumption, income and some assets. A detailed description of these data
sets can be found in Grimm and G¨ unther (2007a).
Information on school enrollment is provided for all children older than ﬁve
years. For all individuals who ever attained school, the surveys asked for the
highest education level achieved. For children older than 9 years, the surveys
also inform whether a child worked, e.g. on the household’s farm or non-farm
business or outside the household.
Given the usual low quality of income data in poor rural settings, I use
household expenditure per capita as an indicator of households’ living stan-
dards. The expenditure aggregate includes self-produced consumption and im-
puted rents. Expenditures were deﬂated over time and space using temporal
and regional price deﬂators. Given the above mentioned tremendous changes
in relative prices in the second half of the nineties, e.g. the substantial rise in
cereal prices, and the signiﬁcant diﬀerences of consumption habits across the
income distribution I use decile-speciﬁc price indices to deﬂate expenditures
over time. Using simply the general consumer price index would over-estimate
the living standard of the poor. This is shown in detail in Grimm and G¨ unther
(2007a).
All those farmers who produced at least one kg of cotton in the survey year
are coded as cotton farmers. All other farmers are coded as food crop farmers.
However, I will test the sensitivity of that deﬁnition to alternative assumptions.
It should be noted that cotton farmers are, as food crop farmers, usually small
family farms with in most cases not more than a view hectares of land.
In what follows I restrict my sample to food-crop and cotton farmers and
exclude pure livestock farmers and all other socio-economic groups. I only
consider rural areas and limit the sample to households in the south and south-
west of the country, excluding the relatively dry tropical savanna in the north.
Applying those criteria reduces the sample to in total 6,610 households for all
three years together. The area is indicated on the map in Figure 3. Although
one can ﬁnd cotton cultivation almost everywhere in the country, in this area
more than 80 percent of the total cotton exports are produced. The oldest




Table 1 shows the development over time of real household expenditures per
capita. The eﬀect of the drought on the purchasing power of farm households is
clearly visible. On average expenditures decreased by almost 25 percent in real
terms. Afterwards households recovered and attained in 2003 a living standard
which was slightly above the one in 1994.
[insert Table 1]
9Comparing cotton farmers with food crop farmers, one can state that expen-
ditures of the latter were depressed much more. Whereas expenditures of cotton
farmers decreased between 1994 and 1998 by only 16 percent, expenditures of
food crop farmers decreased by almost 30 percent. In 2003 cotton households
had expenditures 14.5 percent above those in 1994, food crop household just
met again the level of 1994.
The shares of the two groups of farmers are presented in brackets of Table 1.
As one should expect, households have responded to the opportunities provided
by the cotton sector. The share of cotton households, i.e. households which
produced at least 1kg of cotton, increased by 13.4 percentage points between
1994 and 1998. Given that households who joined the group of cotton farmers
probably allocated less land to cotton production than those households who
had cultivated cotton already for a few years, one can assume that the average
decline of expenditures observed among cotton farmers between 1994 and 1998
would have been smaller without these ‘new’ cotton farmers. In a next step, I
will analyze whether the income shock between 1994 and 1998 aﬀected children’s
school enrollment, and if so, whether this eﬀect was diﬀerent for children of food
crop farmers and cotton farmers.
5.2 School enrollment
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the temporal pattern of enrollment rates for chil-
dren six to thirteen years old of food crop and cotton farmers. This pattern
is obtained by regressing enrollment status on cotton and year dummies and
cotton and year interaction terms. The regression also controls for age (coef-
ﬁcients not presented in table), relationship to the household head i.e. child
of the head or not (coeﬃcients not presented), gender and the interaction of
gender, cotton and year eﬀects. Note that on average 22 percent of the boys
and 15 percent of the girls within that age group are enrolled.
[insert Table 2]
The results suggest that children of cotton households have on average the
same probability to be enrolled than children of food crop farmers. The cot-
ton dummy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In 1998 all children were
signiﬁcantly less likely to be enrolled than in 1994 and 2003. In that year the
enrollment probability was on overage 8.7 percent lower than in the two other
years. However, for children of cotton farmers this eﬀect was on average much
lower. The corresponding coeﬃcient of the cotton-year interaction indicates
that these children had in 1998 a probability to be enrolled which was higher
by 6.4 percent. This interaction eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in 2003.7
The other control variables indicate as one can expect in the given context,
that boys have in general a higher probability to be enrolled in school. But it is
interesting to see that girls were in 1998 less aﬀected by delayed entry and school
drop outs than boys. This could be explained by higher opportunity costs of
schooling for boys. Below I will analyze this issue in more detail. However, it
7The results are qualitatively the same, if a probit model is estimated.
10should already be noted that the interaction term of ‘being a boy’ and ‘being a
child of a cotton household’ is insigniﬁcant. That suggests that boys in cotton
households are on average not more likely to be enrolled or to be at work than
boys in food crop households.
5.3 Education expenditures
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 show the diﬀerential development for school-
ing expenditures per household member and per child enrolled. The result is
consistent with the impact observed for school enrollment: A general decline in
expenditures in 1998 (although not signiﬁcant in column (3), but a positive and
highly signiﬁcant impact of the cotton-year interaction term in 1998. Thus in
1998 cotton households reduced signiﬁcantly less schooling expenditures than
food crop farmers. The linear year eﬀect in combination with the interaction
eﬀect even suggest that there was no reduction at all for cotton farmers. The
cotton dummy is insigniﬁcant, i.e. in normal times, there is no diﬀerence in
schooling expenditures between food crop and cotton farmers.
5.4 Child work
Table (3) shows the results of a multinomial logit regression. The dependent
variable is a categorial variable taking the value ‘one’ if the child only attends
school, ‘two’ if the child attends school and works, ‘three’ if the child only
works and ‘four’ if the child neither attends school nor works. Information
on activities, other than schooling is available for children 10 years and older.
Hence, I include the age group ten to thirteen in the regression.
[insert Table 3]
Child work is relatively widespread in this age group. In the study area
between 60 and 70 percent of all children do some work without attending
school and another ﬁve to ten percent combine school and work. Children
who work, help in most cases (more than 90 percent) on the family farm.
Work outside the household is rather an exception. The surveys do not contain
any information on working hours. Children were only asked what has been
the principal activity, but it was not distinguished between those working and
attending school whether one or the other activity was the main activity. I use
the same control variables than in Table 2.
The multivariate analysis shows that children in cotton households were
working slightly more often than attending school or being inactive than chil-
dren in food crop households. Moreover, in 1998 all children were more likely
to work relative to be at school. They were also less likely to combine work
and school or to be inactive, implying that children either worked or attended
school in that year. At the sample mean, the probability of working relative to
attending school is in 1998 almost 19 percent higher than in 1994 and 2003.
The cotton-time interaction shows that in 1998 children of cotton farmers
were much more likely than children of food crop farmers to attend school rather
than to work. This eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. In that year, children of cotton
11farmers were also more likely than children of food crop farmers to combine
school and work than attending only school. However, this eﬀect is only weakly
signiﬁcant. In 2003 these diﬀerential eﬀects between children of cotton and food
crop farmers disappeared again.
Regarding the gender diﬀerences, boys had a slightly higher probability than
girls to combine school and work than to attend school only. Boys were less
likely than girls to be inactive. There were no diﬀerences between boys and
girls speciﬁc to the year 1998. However, in 2003 it seems that boys were less
likely than girls to work relative to attend to school.
5.5 First conclusions
All results above suggest that food crop farmers were signiﬁcantly hit by the
drought in 1997/98 and that they responded to the associated loss in purchas-
ing power by reducing children’s school enrollment and letting them work more
often. This suggests, as some other studies have found before, that most ru-
ral households in Burkina Faso are unable to smooth consumption over time
through credit and/or savings (Reardon, Matlon and Delgado, 1996; Kazianga
and Udry, 2006). Moreover, the results imply that risk sharing, which would in
this case be possible with cotton farmers, does not happen or, again, happens
only to a very limited extent. However, it is possible that food crop farm-
ers beneﬁtted to some extent from the income development of cotton farmers
through higher demand for labor or goods produced by food crop farmers and
that without these eﬀects the impact of the drought would have been even
worse.
5.6 Income elasticity of school enrollment
The simultaneous shocks induced by the drought and the cotton boom consti-
tute a natural experiment which caused an exogenous variation in income over
time and household groups. This variation may help to identify the causal im-
pact of income on children’s schooling. As discussed in Section 2, there is still
an intense debate about the respective roles of income, parent’s education, and
parents preferences for children’s schooling. So far there is almost no evidence
for Sub-Saharan Africa, although this region has the lowest education levels in
the world.
I only use the period 1994 to 1998 for identiﬁcation as this is the period
in which both shocks occurred. I use expenditure as a proxy for income, thus
ignoring the role of savings. This implies that, if consumption smoothing or
insurance (or both) takes place, for which again there is only weak evidence in
Burkina Faso, the relationship which is analyzed is rather between permanent
or average income and schooling than between current income and schooling.
A standard OLS model of the income eﬀect can be written as follows:






12Enrollment, Sijt is a binary variable taking the value one, if the child i, living in
province j is enrolled in school in year t. Cottonijt takes the value one if the child
lives in a cotton household. Y earijt takes the value one if the child is observed in
1998. The variable lnIncijt stands for the logarithm of household expenditures.
I do not express expenditures in per capita terms, because I assume that this
could lead to identiﬁcation problems in an enrollment equation, given that
fertility and educational investments might be jointly determined and have the
same unobservable determinants. However, if household composition responds
to income shocks, income may have a omitted variable bias (Akresh, 2005).
Whether this is an issue will be examined below. The coeﬃcient δ measures
the income elasticity of school enrollment.
Ageijtk are age-speciﬁc dummies for each age group between seven and thir-
teen years with the age of six being the reference group. X′
ijt is a vector of other
household and individual control variables, including parental education, live-
stock and non-agricultural business ownership, wealth, access to credit, position
of the child in the household, and variables reﬂecting the composition of the
household. θj are province ﬁxed eﬀects to account for diﬀerences in education
supply and other province-speciﬁc eﬀects which otherwise might be picked up
by the remaining included variables if those are correlated over time.8 Given
that the unobservables of children living in the same household are likely to be
correlated, I use robust standard errors for inference.
An OLS estimate of the income eﬀect above is obviously subject to num-
ber of biases. In principle, the most important ones are the simultaneity bias
and the omitted variables bias. The simultaneity bias arises if enrollment is a
substitute for child work and thus has a negative impact on household income.
Simultaneity would bias δ downward. Given the extent of child work in Burkina
Faso, it is likely that this bias arises. However, each of the activities, school
and work on the family farm need not necessarily the whole day, both can be
combined as seen above, reducing probably the downward bias.
Omitted variable bias can stem from a number of reasons and can introduce
a down or an upward bias. For instance, unobserved parental abilities may have
a positive impact on income and make it more likely that parents send their
children to school. This would upward bias the income eﬀect. Household income
could also be correlated with better opportunities for children to get a job which
requires a certain level of education. This would increase the expected returns
to education and thus again bias the income eﬀect upward. The omission of
parental education, household assets and location-speciﬁc characteristics could
also lead to a biased estimate of δ, but those factors can, at least to some extent,
be controlled.9
8One might prefer to include cluster-speciﬁc instead of province-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. How-
ever, those units are not constant over time and, hence, I would have to mix the time with the
ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, that would entail problems for the identiﬁcation strategy explained
below, given that many of these cluster would not have enough farmers from either group.
9A detailed discussion why marginal private beneﬁts of schooling are likely to be associated
with household income in the context of a low income country and why a simple OLS estimate
of the income elasticity of schooling might be biased is provided by Behrman and Knowles,
1999).
13A further downward bias of the income eﬀect may result from measurement
error in the income variable. Although for most industrialized countries that
bias should be negligible, in the case of a poor agrarian country that bias can be
very important and may even dominate the two other biases. Household surveys
of the type undertaken in Burkina Faso ask households for pre-speciﬁed recall
periods how much they spent on a speciﬁc good or group of goods. The recall
period is for food usually a week, for clothes, transport etc. a months and for
durables, education etc. a year. Obviously the potential error in these types of
questions is huge (see e.g., Deaton, 1997; and Deaton and Grosh, 2000).
It is not straightforward to get a rough estimate to what extent measurement
error could bias the income eﬀect. Validation surveys are frequently conducted
in industrialized countries (see e.g., Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001), but
do not exist for the Sub-Saharan African context. One possibility would be to
rely on simulated errors and to make a sensitivity analysis under various as-
sumptions about the variance of the error term and its correlation with income.
This is however left for future work.
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the income eﬀect on school en-
rollment, I make use, as mentioned above, of the natural experiment provided
by the simultaneous occurrence of the drought and the cotton boom. As an
instrument for income, I use ‘being a cotton farmer in 1998’ conditional on
‘being a cotton farmer’ and ‘being observed in 1998’. Using this instrument,
Equation (1) reads:





where the ﬁrst stage equation is given by




ijtν + ξj + ωijt.
This instrumentation yields in fact a ‘diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence’ estimator, since
it compares within provinces the diﬀerence between 1994 and 1998 in the dif-
ference in school enrollment between children of food crop farmers and cotton
farmers. This kind of instrumentation is also used by Cogneau and Jedwab
(2007) to identify the income elasticity of schooling using cocoa price shocks in
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire.10 The principle of this approach is of course also very similar to
the technique employed by Duﬂo (2001).
Obviously a number of assumptions have to be veriﬁed such that this instru-
mentation is valid and yields an unbiased income eﬀect. First, the instrument
10Rucci (2004) used both in her study, a simple diﬀerence estimator and a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimator. To implement the latter she assumes that children of well educated
parents have been diﬀerently aﬀected by the crisis than children of less educated parents. She
argues that this diﬀerence arises, because educated parents might be less credit constrained.
However, if this was the case, the measured eﬀect would not be anymore a pure income eﬀect,
but an eﬀect due to incomplete markets.
14needs to be relevant. That this is the case, was shown in Table 1. Whereas food
crop farmers and cotton farmers had a similar living standard in 1994, cotton
farmers were signiﬁcantly richer than food crop farmers in 1998. Second, being
a cotton farmer in that particular year 1998 has to be uncorrelated with the
error term in the main equation of (2), i.e. the instrument should not have any
direct impact on school enrollment other than its impact through income, once
the linear eﬀect of time and ‘being a cotton farmer’ is controlled for. Table 2
shows that the cotton dummy is not signiﬁcant in a simple enrollment equation
suggesting that the instrument is indeed exogenous. In fact, even if the cotton
dummy was signiﬁcant, the instrumentation would be valid, as long as the level
eﬀect between food crop and cotton farmers is constant across time.
The instrumentation could still be invalid, if food crop farmers and cotton
farmers diﬀered with respect to unobservables which are correlated with the
instrument. For example if cotton farmers would have assets which food crop
farmers do not have and if these assets allowed cotton farmers to cope more
easily with shocks. Table 4 shows the education related observables in our
sample. If for those variables we state no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
children of food crop farmers and cotton farmers, we may hope that there are
also no substantial diﬀerences in the unobservables, but of course we cannot be
sure that this is true.
[insert Table 4]
Table 4 shows that for most variables there are indeed no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences. The diﬀerence in the mean age between 1994, 1998 and 2003 corre-
sponds to the diﬀerence of the time in which these surveys have been carried
out. The diﬀerences in the relationship of the children to the household head
and household size between food crop and cotton farmers and the change of
these diﬀerences over time, suggest that some children from food crop farmers
were fostered by cotton farmers after the drought. Akresh (2005) has provided
evidence that, for instance, households in the Bazega province—which is out-
side the area which is covered by this paper—rely on child fostering to mitigate
shocks.11 There is no signiﬁcant age diﬀerence for household heads between
both groups, but household heads in cotton households are more often a male.
Household heads have slightly more education in cotton households, but this
is mainly due to the diﬀerence in household head’s gender. Cotton households
are a bit wealthier, own more often livestock and run more often also a non
farm business. However, they are more often credit constrained than food crop
farmers, although being credit constraint is only rudimentarily measured. A
household is considered as being credit constrained if it requested an agricul-
tural credit, but did not get one.12 All these diﬀerences in observables will be
controlled.
11In another paper Akresh (2004) shows that the foster children are equally likely as their
host siblings to be enrolled and they are slightly more likely to be enrolled than their bio-
logical siblings, but both the foster children and their biological siblings experience increased
enrollment after the fostering exchange.
12In 2005, in Burkina Faso only 22.5 percent of the households beneﬁtted from credits
from micro-lending institutions (African Development Fund, 2006). Cotton farmers have in
15Finally the instrumentation would also be invalid, if those households who
became ‘new’ cotton farmers between 1994 and 1998 did switch to that activ-
ity for the purpose of ensuring that their children can go or stay in school.
Professional mobility, like geographical mobility, could in addition invalidate
the instrumentation strategy, if both processes led to diﬀerences in the unob-
servable determinants of enrollment within each group between both years. In
other words the control and treatment groups would not exactly be the same
over time. Again, it is diﬃcult to rule out completely this potential bias, but I
will provide below a number of robustness checks which all indicate that there
is no substantial bias in that direction. For instance, I will introduce an inter-
action term for having been a cotton farmer in 1998, but not in 1997. I will
also run the regression by excluding completely from the estimation those who
joined after 1997. I will also change the deﬁnition of cotton farmers according
to the amount of cotton produced or according to the share of cotton income
in total agricultural income.
Table 5 shows the estimation results. Given the diﬀerences in enrollment
patterns for boys and girls, I run the estimations separately for boys and girls.
For boys the OLS estimate in column (1) suggests that a 10 percent increase in
household income leads to an increase in the probability of being enrolled of 0.64
percent, controlling for age, household composition characteristics, parental ed-
ucation, livestock ownership, non-farm business ownership and province ﬁxed
eﬀects. For girls (column (7)) this elasticity is 0.49 percent. Both coeﬃcients
are highly signiﬁcant. The cotton dummy is insigniﬁcant, supporting the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy for the income eﬀect below. The 1998 year dummy indicates
that in 1998 enrollment rates were on average lower by 7 percentage points
for boys and 4.5 percentage points for girls. Parental education has (or more
precisely education of the household head and his/her spouse) a signiﬁcant
positive impact on enrollment rates, in particular for girls. Ownership of a
private non-farm business has also a positive impact, in particular for boys.
This could suggest two things. First, a wealth eﬀect or, second, a returns to
education eﬀect. If education is particularly valuable for running a non-farm
business, parents owning such a business may invest more in the education of
their children. Livestock ownership has no signiﬁcant impact.
[insert Table 5]
If income is instrumented (columns (2) and (8)) the income eﬀect rises sub-
stantially. For boys the income eﬀect increases to 0.268, suggesting that an
increase of income by 10 percent increases the probability of enrollment, on
average, by 2.7 percent, that is roughly four times the eﬀect suggested by the
OLS regression. The F-statistic in the corresponding ﬁrst-stage regression is
far above the critical value of ten, indicating again that the used instrument
is relevant. For girls the instrumented income eﬀect is even higher than for
boys, and again, the F-statistic indicates that the instrument is relevant. The
cotton dummy is still insigniﬁcant. The eﬀects of parental education decrease
addition access to credit to ﬁnance their inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, but these credits
cannot be used to cover other expenditures.
16signiﬁcantly, for both boys and girls, showing that a simple OLS estimation un-
derstates the income eﬀect and overstates the parental education eﬀect. Busi-
ness ownership is not anymore signiﬁcant. The comparison of the OLS income
eﬀect with the instrumented income eﬀect implies that the simultaneity bias
and the measurement error bias dominate. Of course, it would be interesting
to disentangle both, but again this will be left for future work. But, it is likely
that in particular the measurement error bias leads to such a low OLS estimate.
To investigate in more detail whether wealth ownership or access to credit
introduces a bias into the instrumented income eﬀect, I add as regressors in
columns (3), (4), (9) and (10) a wealth index and the above mentioned measure
of credit restrictions. Introducing these controls can avoid a bias which can stem
from the fact that cotton households have on average higher wealth holdings
than food crop households. Introducing these controls lowers the OLS income
eﬀect, but does not alter the instrumented income eﬀect, again supporting the
identiﬁcation strategy. Finally, I add the square root of household size as a
control variable (columns (5), (6), (7) and (8)) accounting for the fact that
households may respond to income shocks by adjusting household structure.
Indeed the income eﬀect goes further up, showing that income and household
size are positively correlated. Cotton households might have received foster
children of food crop households after the drought leading to a lower growth
in per capita terms than in absolute terms. This can also explain the lower
F-statistic, though still above ten for boys and girls.
5.7 Robustness checks
As discussed above, activity changes, and in particular farmers who started to
grow cotton following the price incentives may bias the estimates of the income
eﬀect. To test the robustness of the estimates in Table 5, I re-estimate the
model under various alternative assumptions. Table 6 shows the results.
First, I introduce in Equation (2) an interaction term between ‘being a cot-
ton farmer in 1998’ and ‘having not been a cotton farmer the season before’.
For boys, the income eﬀects for both estimations, OLS and IV, remain more
or less unchanged. The F-statistic of the ﬁrst-stage regression of the IV esti-
mation goes even further up, showing that once controlled for the ‘newcomer
status’, ‘being a cotton farmer in 1998’ is even more correlated with income.
For girls, the interaction term is signiﬁcant. The F-statistic goes down and
the instrumented income eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant, although the size of the
income eﬀect is not much altered. In the next row, I exclude all households who
joined the cotton sector after 1997 from the estimation. The F-statistics for
boys and girls increase substantially. The instrumented income eﬀect for boys
is close to the estimate in Table 5 and for girls the eﬀect converges to that for
boys.
[insert Table 6]
Another way of dealing with the problem of households which switched to
cotton production is to exclude those households which produced only rela-
tively small quantities of cotton. The assumption is that new cotton farmers
17allocate on average less land to cotton than well-experienced cotton farmers.13
Of course, the risk is to exclude also systematically cotton farmers who have
not much land and are thus relatively poor. I use two alternative cut-oﬀ points.
The ﬁrst eliminates all farmers who produced less than 50kg of cotton, which
removes 10 percent of the cotton farmers from the sample. The second cut-oﬀ
point eliminates all farmers who produced less than 250kg of cotton, which re-
moves 25 percent of the cotton farmers from the sample.14 With the ﬁrst cut-oﬀ
point the results for boys lead to a lower IV estimate and a similar First-stage
F-statistic. For girls the instrument becomes weak and the income eﬀect turns
out be insigniﬁcant. Using the second cut-oﬀ point, the instrumentation looses
also its power for boys and the instrumented income eﬀect goes substantially
up. However, the second cut-oﬀ point is really far beyond the upper bound and
removes obviously not only many ‘newcomers’, but many poor cotton farmers
in general.
Finally, I exclude those households from the cotton sample which draw
only a relatively small share of their total agricultural income from cotton.
Again I use two cut-oﬀ points, the ﬁrst at 10 percent (removing 9 percent of all
cotton households from the sample) and the second at 50 percent (removing 27
percent). In all cases, for boys and girls, the F-statistics go up, that is what
one expects. Of course the higher the share of income a farmer draws from
cotton, the more his income was (positively) aﬀected in 1998. The IV estimates
of the income eﬀect go down for boys and girls, and more so, when the higher
cut-oﬀ point is used. With the 50 percent cut-oﬀ point the income elasticity of
enrollment is 0.219 for boys and 0.276 for girls.
These robustness checks suggest that activity changes did not drive the
results and did not lead to a substantial bias. Thus, income matters. The true
average income eﬀect seems to be between 0.22 and 0.26, that is between three
and four times the OLS eﬀect. However, the OLS estimate might be strongly
downward biased, not only because of a ‘simultaneity bias’ but also because of
‘measurement error’ bias. Again, exploring the pure role of measurement error
is left for future work.
6 Policy simulations
In what follows, I use the estimated income eﬀect on children’s schooling to
explore the potential eﬀects of unconditional transfer programs on school en-
rollment rates of children six to thirteen years old. At this stage I rely on a
pure accounting micro-simulation method. I neglect any further behavioral re-
actions by households for instance regarding labor supply, crop choice or house-
hold composition. I also discard any general equilibrium eﬀects, which might
result from such transfer programs and I ignore how such programs could be
ﬁnanced. However, the simulation relies on an estimated income eﬀect which
13Note that the size of the plots allocated to cotton and cultivated land size in general is
not available in the surveys.
14Note that quantities can only be computed approximately since respondents had the
possibility to provide the quantities in terms of the number of baskets, sacks etc. These
information where then converted in number of kg.
18should be closer to the true causal eﬀect than income eﬀects based on simple
cross-section correlations between income and enrollment. This quantitative
diﬀerence between both eﬀects is illustrated in Figure 4.
[insert Figure 4]
Kakwani, Soares and Son (2006), for instance, perform similar simulations
for a large set of African countries (including Burkina Faso). They rely on the
non-instrumented income eﬀect, which is similar to the one estimated in this
paper when simply OLS is used. Thus, their simulations should systematically
underestimate the eﬀects of unconditional cash transfers on enrollment rates.
I focus on the predicted average eﬀect and assume that residuals are nor-
mally distributed. In each simulation, I compute for each individual the score
of being enrolled, ˜ Sijt:
˜ Sijt = ˆ δ ˜ Incijt + φ¯ Ωijt, (3)
where ˆ δ stands for the estimated income eﬀect in Equation (2), ˜ Incijt stands for
the household income after cash transfers have been made and φ stands for the
eﬀect of all other variables in Equation (2), ˆ Ωijt. The latter are held constant
in the simulations. Thus, the principle of the simulations is to compute what
happens to the average enrollment rate ¯ S = ˜ Sijt/n if income for each individual
i is shifted from Incijt to ˜ Incijt.
I simulate three types of transfer schemes. First, one where all households
with children in the relevant age group receive the same amount of cash, ex-
pressed as a share of the yearly per capita poverty line of 53219 CFA Francs
(Grimm and G¨ unther, 2007a). Second, one where speciﬁc households are tar-
geted dependent on their income or location they live in. Third, one where
cash transfers are higher for girls than for boys. Table 7 shows the results. The
population on which the simulations are done, is that of 1998.
[insert Table 7]
First of all one can see that the prediction for the baseline case accurately
represents the observed average enrollment rate. The average enrollment rate
is very low, but it should be noted that I look only at rural households. Cash
transfers of 25 percent of the poverty line tend to increase the average school
enrollment rate in the study region by 4 percent (simulation 1). A transfer of
200 percent of the poverty line is necessary to lift that average by 30 percent
(simulation 4).
If the transfers are targeted to the children of the poorest 25 percent of all
households and the same total amount of money is distributed than in the case
of a 100 percent-of-the-poverty-line-transfer-to-all-children (simulation 3), the
average enrollment rate goes up by 23.7 percent (simulation 5). That is much
more than in the case where the same amount of cash is universally distributed
to all children. The eﬀect is even higher if not the poorest 25 percent but the
poorest 50 percent are targeted holding constant the total amount of transfers
(simulation 6).
19Obviously, the involved administrative costs in such a targeting conditional
on income might be high. An alternative might be to target entire provinces
or villages conditional on their average enrollment rates. If the 11 provinces
with the lowest enrollment rates are targeted covering roughly 50 percent of
all children, the enrollment rate goes up by 17.2 percent (simulation 7) and if
instead of provinces, the most needy villages are targeted it goes up by 16.1
percent (simulation 8). Thus, it is better (and probably cheaper) to target entire
provinces than entire villages (ignoring all other aspects, which might justify
an intervention at a speciﬁc location). However, both ‘policies’ are worse than
the transfers targeted conditional on household income.
The last two simulations favor girls relative to boys. The ﬁrst simulation
examines the eﬀects of providing transfers to all children but to provide twice as
much to girls than to boys. The average eﬀect is not much diﬀerent than under
simulation 3, however, girls’ enrollment should of course be higher. The last
simulation targets girls in the most needy provinces, thus it combines simulation
7 and 9. Again the eﬀect is similar to the balanced transfers to provinces
(simulation 7), but again girls’ enrollment should be higher.
In summary, although these results should be seen in relation to each other
and in terms of their direction and should certainly not be interpreted as an
accurate speciﬁcation of the potential eﬀects if such policies were really im-
plemented, they have some interesting implications. First, the results suggest
that unconditional transfers have a higher potential eﬀect than often believed.
Kakwani et al. (2006) found only very modest eﬀects of income transfers. This
study shows that they probably underestimated the income eﬀect and hence
underestimated also the potential impact of cash transfer programs. However,
even if the involved eﬀects are higher in this paper, it seems likely that the
eﬃciency of such transfers can be increased if they can be made conditional on
enrollment, given that this would reinforce the income eﬀect through a reduc-
tion of the shadow price of schooling.15 This of course requires that institutions
are built which can implement such schemes. The simulations in this study also
show that transfers targeted to the poor population in general might be more
eﬃcient than universal transfers or location-speciﬁc targeting. However, in
practices one has to account for the costs of such a targeting. An issue not
addressed in this paper.
7 Concluding remarks
The distributional eﬀects of rising food prices between 1994 and 1998 in Burk-
ina Faso, driven by among other things the drought of 1997/98, have been
overseen by several previous studies. This paper shows that there was not only
a substantial impact on household income but also on children’s schooling. The
exact eﬀects are identiﬁed using a natural experiment, provided by the fact that
in the same time the drought occurred the cotton sector knew an notable boom
caused by the CFA Franc devaluation in 1994 and a favorable development of
15Bourguignon Fereirra and Leite (2003) ﬁnd a similar result for Brazil. See also De Janvry,
Finan, Sadoulet and Vakis (2006).
20the world market price for cotton. Thus, cotton farmers had an exogenous
variation in income which was diﬀerent from the variation faced by food crop
farmers. Incomes of the latter declined almost twice as much as those of the
former.
This study provides evidence that in order to cope with the shocks food crop
farmers signiﬁcantly decreased enrollment of their children (either by withdraw-
ing enrolled children or by not enrolling children at the ﬁrst place) and let them
work in higher numbers, mostly on their family farm. This diﬀerential eﬀect is
also reﬂected in schooling expenditures.
This study also shows that the income elasticity of enrollment is much higher
than a simple OLS regression would suggest. Thus income matters. The sub-
stantial downward bias of the OLS estimate is probably caused by both, a si-
multaneity bias and a non-negligible measurement error bias. So far, the causal
impact of income on schooling has only rarely be shown for the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa. It suggests that cash transfer programs, could in principle also
be successful in this region. This is illustrated using simple policy simulations
under various targeting rules. The main obstacle for their implementation is in
most countries of that region obviously the lack of institutional and ﬁnancial
capacity to run such a program.
Besides the need for interventions to raise enrollment levels in general, which
again could in principle be achieved through (conditional) cash transfer pro-
grams, there is of course a need for safety nets to ensure that children have not
to be withdrawn from school in periods of economic hardship. Even delayed
enrollment and enrollment interruptions can have adverse eﬀects on educational
achievements. Safety nets could be provided by income assistance during peri-
ods of crisis or by improved access to credit and savings to allow households to
smooth more easily consumption.
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24Tables and Figures
Table 1
Yearly household expenditure per capita
(in 1000 CFA Francs, population weighted)
1994 1998 2003
All Farm Househ. 61.7 47.0 64.6
(100.0) (76.2) (104.8)
Cotton Househ. 62.0 [0.182] 52.0 [0.316] 71.0 [0.370]
(100.0) (83.8) (114.5)
Food Crop Househ. 61.5 [0.674] 43.4 [0.599] 59.4 [0.517]
(100.0) (70.5) (96.6)
Notes: In parentheses changes over time (1994=100). In brackets, share of cotton and food
crop households respectively.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
Table 2
Temporal pattern of diﬀerential enrollment rates and school expenditures




School enrollment Schooling expend. Schooling expend.
6-13 years old per househ. member per child enrolled
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Cotton Househ. -0.001 0.029 0.795 0.511 0.865 0.594
Year 1998 -0.081 *** 0.022 -1.398 *** 0.327 -0.232 0.385
Year 2003 -0.005 0.024 -0.305 0.330 0.616 0.383
Cotton × Year 1998 0.064 ** 0.032 1.462 ** 0.620 1.388 * 0.730
Cotton × Year 2003 -0.019 0.033 -0.372 0.617 -0.502 0.722
Boy 0.101 *** 0.023
Boy × Cotton 0.011 0.017
Boy × Year 1998 -0.044 * 0.025
Boy × Year 2003 -0.026 0.026
Household Head Male 0.513 0.423 0.873 * 0.496
Observations 12273 6645 3897
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. ∗ signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at the
5% level, ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Stars refer to standard errors of regression coeﬃcients,
not to those of marginal eﬀects. Regression (1) also controls for age and relationship of child
to household head. Intercept included but not reported here. Baseline year is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
25Table 3
Temporal pattern of school enrollment, child work and inactivity
Cotton vs. Food Crop Households, Children 10 to 13 years old
Marginal eﬀects from a multinomial logit, enrollment is baseline outcome
School and work Work Inactivity
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Cotton Househ. 0.012 * 0.012 0.093 * 0.045 -0.028 0.017
Year 1998 -0.030 * 0.011 0.143 * 0.039 -0.056 ** 0.013
Year 2003 -0.053 *** 0.011 0.038 0.040 -0.018 * 0.010
Cotton × Year 1998 0.027 0.021 -0.185 *** 0.058 0.038 0.033
Cotton × Year 2003 -0.019 0.009 -0.055 0.057 0.006 0.023
Boy 0.014 * 0.008 0.013 0.038 -0.075 *** 0.017
Boy × Cotton -0.013 * 0.008 -0.012 0.030 0.016 0.017
Boy × Year 1998 0.004 0.010 -0.061 0.045 0.036 0.025
Boy × Year 2003 0.059 0.048 -0.122 0.054 0.056 * 0.029
Observations 5319
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. ∗ signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at the
5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Regression also controls for age and relationship of
child to household head. Intercept included but not reported here. Base year for year eﬀects
is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
26Table 4
Characteristics of children (6 to 13 years old) and the households they live in
1994 1998 2003
Food crop Cotton Food crop Cotton Food crop Cotton
Age 9.054 9.055 9.202 9.184 9.205 9.113
Boy 0.540 0.552 0.533 0.545 0.514 0.516
Child of househ. head 0.783 0.821 0.872 0.773 0.880 0.899
Household Size 9.101 10.959 8.795 11.213 8.051 9.067
Share women in househ. 0.496 0.477 0.509 0.492 0.522 0.505
Share children 6-13 in househ. 0.294 0.277 0.323 0.289 0.314 0.298
Household head male 0.914 0.967 0.919 0.974 0.896 0.978
Household head age 46.358 45.229 47.711 47.318 47.830 46.260
Househ. head migrated last 5 years 0.062 0.025 0.066 0.055 n.a. n.a.
Househ. head some primary 0.061 0.089 0.060 0.090 0.066 0.097
Househ. head primary completed 0.028 0.056 0.029 0.055 0.030 0.057
Spouse of head some primary 0.045 0.054 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.059
Household owns livestock 0.669 0.776 0.798 0.920 0.796 0.933
Household owns non-farm business 0.516 0.596 0.266 0.276 0.391 0.358
Value of asset index -0.757 -0.514 -0.836 -0.400 -0.785 -0.544
Household credit constrained 0.035 0.046 0.036 0.072 0.269 0.384
Notes: The means of ‘Age’, ‘Boy’ and ‘Child of household head’ are computed over all chil-
dren. The remaining variables are means over all households to which the children belong.
The questionnaire on ‘Non farm business’ varies slightly from year to year. The asset index
includes ownership of the following assets: radio, TV, bike, motorbike, fridge, connection to
electricity, connection to taped water, modern toilet, good ﬂoor and wall materials. The index
is computed on the national level using principal component analysis. The national average
is normalized to zero in each year. A household is deﬁned as credit constrained, if it asked for
agricultural credit, but did not get it.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; computations by the author.
27Table 5
The income elasticity of school enrollment, 1994 – 1998
Children 6 to 13 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Boys
Main equation
Cotton Househ. -0.012 0.022 -0.040 0.028 -0.010 0.021 -0.040 0.027 -0.011 0.022 -0.019 0.021
Year 1998 -0.071 *** 0.019 -0.092 *** 0.021 -0.075 *** 0.018 -0.094 *** 0.020 -0.072 *** 0.019 -0.114 *** 0.031
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.064 *** 0.012 0.268 ** 0.120 0.029 ** 0.013 0.265 ** 0.127 0.067 *** 0.015 0.373 ** 0.187
HH head some primary 0.101 *** 0.034 0.088 ** 0.035 0.079 ** 0.034 0.081 ** 0.034 0.100 *** 0.034 0.065 0.041
Spouse some primary 0.190 *** 0.053 0.151 *** 0.051 0.154 *** 0.059 0.140 *** 0.047 0.189 *** 0.053 0.137 *** 0.053
HH owns livestock -0.016 0.022 -0.099 * 0.053 -0.011 0.021 -0.100 * 0.052 -0.015 0.022 -0.074 * 0.042
HH owns non-agri. bus. 0.072 *** 0.019 0.041 0.025 0.053 *** 0.018 0.035 * 0.019 0.073 *** 0.019 0.050 ** 0.022
Wealth index 0.075 *** 0.010 0.020 0.031
Credit constrained 0.036 0.054 -0.014 0.057
HH size (Square root) -0.006 0.012 -0.136 * 0.081
Provincial ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998 0.291 *** 0.050 0.274 *** 0.048 0.196 *** 0.044
F-Stat 33.5 32.9 19.7
Observations 4359 4359 4359 4359 4359 4359
Notes: See next page.
2
8Table 5 (... continued.)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Girls
Main equation
Cotton Househ. 0.009 0.022 -0.042 0.043 0.007 0.022 -0.038 0.034 0.015 0.022 -0.005 0.026
Year 1998 -0.045 ** 0.018 -0.077 *** 0.027 -0.047 *** 0.018 -0.074 *** 0.022 -0.049 *** 0.018 -0.094 *** 0.036
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.049 *** 0.012 0.308 * 0.183 0.019 0.012 0.297 * 0.160 0.066 *** 0.015 0.363 * 0.217
HH head some primary 0.161 *** 0.040 0.140 *** 0.038 0.147 *** 0.039 0.147 *** 0.035 0.155 *** 0.039 0.108 ** 0.048
Spouse some primary 0.158 *** 0.048 0.123 ** 0.054 0.128 *** 0.047 0.134 *** 0.048 0.161 *** 0.047 0.142 *** 0.047
HH owns livestock 0.037 0.023 -0.067 0.076 0.038 * 0.023 -0.059 0.059 0.040 * 0.023 -0.034 0.057
HH owns non-agri. bus. 0.030 * 0.017 -0.016 0.036 0.017 0.017 -0.009 0.021 0.033 * 0.017 0.009 0.023
Wealth index 0.058 *** 0.012 -0.018 0.044
Credit constrained 0.048 0.040 0.003 0.047
HH size (Square root) -0.028 ** 0.012 -0.152 * 0.092
Provincial ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998 0.189 *** 0.057 0.213 *** 0.053 0.160 *** 0.049
F-Stat 11.1 16.3 10.6
Observations 3708 3708 3708 3708 3708 3708
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ signiﬁcant at the
10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Regressions control also for age, being the eldest child in the household, being a
child of the household head, the share of female household members, the share of children 6-13 years old in the household and whether the household head is
a male. Intercept included but not reported here. The ﬁrst-stage regression includes also all other variables from the main equation as instruments. Base year
for year eﬀects is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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The income elasticity of school enrollment, 1994 – 1998 — Robustness checks
Children 6 to 13 years old
Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Interaction term: Household was not a cotton household in previous year
Cotton Househ. -0.015 0.023 -0.047 0.030 -0.010 0.024 -0.054 0.044
Cotton × No Cott. in t − 1 0.013 0.033 0.041 0.033 0.081 ** 0.037 0.097 *** 0.034
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.064 *** 0.012 0.249 ** 0.111 0.050 *** 0.012 0.253 0.171
First stage F-Stat 37.9 11.8
Without those households having not been a cotton household in previous year
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.060 *** 0.013 0.269 *** 0.103 0.050 *** 0.012 0.239 * 0.144
First stage F-Stat 44.6 16.3
Without those households having produced less than 50kg cotton (removes 10% from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.066 *** 0.013 0.226 * 0.119 0.053 *** 0.012 0.271 0.231
First stage F-Stat 30.4 5.9
Without those households having produced less than 250kg cotton (removes 25% from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.062 *** 0.013 0.410 * 0.224 0.051 *** 0.012 0.600 0.394
First stage F-Stat 10.3 3.1
Without those households where cotton income share less than 10% (removes 9% from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.061 *** 0.013 0.229 ** 0.109 0.048 *** 0.012 0.347 ** 0.149
First stage F-Stat 39.3 17.9
Without those households where cotton income share less than 50% (removes 27.7% from sample)
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.065 *** 0.012 0.219 ** 0.126 0.052 *** 0.012 0.276 * 0.147
First stage F-Stat 27.6 17.0
3
0Table 6 (... continued.)
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ signiﬁcant at the
10% level, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Regressions correspond to those presented in Table 5.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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Simulation of various unconditional transfer programs
Children 6 to 13 years old, population 1998
(Simulations use parameters of Table 5, cols. (4) and (10))
Enrollment
rate
Baseline 1998 observed 0.189
Baseline 1998 predicted 0.187
Percentage of Transfer per child Percentage
children as percentage deviation from
beneﬁtting of poverty line baseline
(1) Universal transfer of 25 percent of poverty line 100 25.0 4.4
(2) Universal transfer of 50 percent of poverty line 100 50.0 8.6
(3) Universal transfer of 100 percent of poverty line 100 100.0 16.5
(4) Universal transfer of 200 percent of poverty line 100 200.0 30.7
(5) Transfer sum of (3) distributed to households of poorest quartile 13 750.2 23.7
(6) Transfer sum of (3) distributed to households of poorest two quartiles 34 293.2 24.4
(7) Transfer sum of (3) distributed to 11 provinces with lowest enrollment rates 50 213.1 17.2
(8) Transfer sum of (3) distributed to 65 villages (EU) with lowest enrollment rates 50 201.8 16.1
(9) Transfer sum of (3) universally distributed, but double transfer to girls 100 68.6 (Boys) 16.7
137.2 (Girls)
(10) Transfer sum of (3) distributed to 11 provinces with lowest enrollment rates, 50 144.7 (Boys) 17.2
but double transfer to girls 289.4 (Girls)
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations and simulations by the author.
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Notes: Total food means tons of millet, sorghum and maize.
Source: Economic Accounts for the Agricultural Sector, based on Enquˆ ete Agricole (data not
available for harvests before 1996).
Figure 2





























Notes: Annual average prices (collected on 37 diﬀerent regional markets).
Source: Cereal prices: Grain Market Price Surveillance System, Ministry of Trade. Cotton price:
Ouedraogo, Sanou and Sissao (2003).
33Figure 3
Provinces included in empirical analysis
Source: United Nations.
34Figure 4
Relative change in enrollment rates by income
Source: Simulations by the author.
35